This paper utilizes the self-employed to analyze the observed increase in the educational earnings premium in the 1980's. The paper compares the predictions of the signaling and human capital models in response to an exogenous demand shock such as a skill-biased technological change. Since the self-employed have no incentive to invest in a costly signal to show to employers their productivity, a change in the schooling equilibrium should not affect their earnings. Four testable hypotheses are derived. The findings suggest that the signaling model may indeed predict the observed changes in the schooling premium that are not consistent with the predictions of the human capital model.
Introduction
The observed increase in the U.S. educational earnings premium in the 1980's is a well-known economic phenomenon and is also one important factor in explaining the increase in earnings inequality during the same period. The causes of the increase in earnings dispersion are however not generally agreed upon. Explanations include the increase in international trade, immigration, de-unionization and the drop in the real value of the minimum wage. Although these factors have been shown to be important in explaining some of the increase in the dispersion of earnings, none seems to satisfactory explain changes both within and between sectors or groups defined by education or experience.
Given that the number of college educated individuals increased in the 1980's, an increase in the relative demand for more educated individuals appears to be the dominating force behind the increase in the educational earnings premium. The explanation most commonly, and maybe most convincingly, that has been put forward is a skill-biased technological change (see for example Bound and Johnson, 1992) .
In this paper I test whether the increase in earnings inequality and the educational earnings premium in the U.S. in the 1980's is consistent with the predictions of a version of a signaling model, originally developed by Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975) . Krugman (2000) suggested the possibility that a signaling model could help explain the observed increases in earnings inequality. The question posed is: can an increase in the proportion of "high-productivity" workers who choose to obtain higher levels of education to distinguish themselves from "low-productivity" workers explain the trend?
If so, the average quality of low education level workers will be lowered and would consequently increase the earnings gap between them and higher schooled workers. The paper does not attempt to refute neither the human capital model nor the signaling model.
The testable predictions in Krugman's model refer to a possible shift in the schooling equilibrium from a human capital regime to a signaling regime. That is, the paper attempts to analyze whether the new equilibrium, and the changes that took place in the U.S. in the 1980's, are best described by education serving as a screen rather than as a human capital investment in order to enhance productivity.
To test this hypothesis I compare changes in the educational earnings premium for wage/salary workers and the self-employed. Self-employed individuals do not have an incentive to obtain the signal that education carries with it and would likely earn their true productivity.
1 Wage/salary workers on the other hand would earn a wage based on the average productivity of their group. The result would be a lower rate of growth of the earnings gap between the high and low educated in the self-employment sector than in the wage/salary sector. 
The Signaling Model
1 The idea of using the self-employed to test whether education may be viewed as a screen has been utilized before. Wolpin (1977) compares mean educational attainment, ability test scores and earnings between entrepreneurs and employees using a sample of World War II veterans. Wolpin shows, for example, that mean earnings is higher among the self-employed than for wage/salary workers but he does not estimate any earnings models. Riley (1979) also uses the argument that the role of education as a screen is stronger for some occupations than others, and finds support for education as a screening mechanism. 2 The literature on over-and under-schooling shows that the returns to education are different depending on the schooling level required by an individual's job. Since the concepts of over-and under-education is hard to apply to the self-employed, it is difficult to say what effects the structural labor market changes in the 1980's may have had on the differences in the changes in the schooling premium between the selfemployed and wage/salary workers. However, Daly et al (2000) find no evidence that the returns to over and under-education changed between 1976 and 1985 . This suggests that the results found in this paper are not due to changes in the schooling premium of surplus or deficit education in the wage/salary sector.
This paper utilizes a version of the well-known signaling model first developed by Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1975) and later modified by Krugman (2000) . In this model workers choose education not to increase their productivity, as in the human capital model, but to signal to employers their productivity. The paper tests the hypothesis that the increase in earnings inequality in the 1980's is related to changes in a signaling equilibrium in which "high-productivity" workers choose higher educational levels to allow them to be distinguished from "low-productivity" workers, as was suggested by Krugman (2000) . If this is the case, earnings inequality should not have increased at the same rate for the self-employed in the 1980's.
The model used in this paper to derive testable predictions is Krugman's (2000) version of a signaling model. In this framework there are two types of workers, "good"
and "bad", and two kinds of jobs, managerial and non-managerial. It is assumed that it is prohibitively costly for firms to determine the ability of a worker and consequently a worker's true productivity. However, a worker can signal to an employer his ability by investing in a signal, i.e. a college education. Obtaining the signal is sufficiently more expensive for 'bad" workers than it is for "good" workers that a college degree can only be obtained by the "good" workers. Furthermore, the managerial jobs require a college degree. Moreover, "good" workers are more productive in non-managerial jobs and subsequently earn higher wages in these jobs than "bad" workers do. However, to obtain a higher wage, "good" workers need to obtain a college degree.
Krugman also assumes that there are two sectors, one manager intensive and one non-manager intensive. The two inputs in production of the two goods are labor in the form of managers and non-managers. The economy is assumed to be open facing a less than perfectly elastic rest-of-world offer curve. The payoff to education is measured as the ratio of college to no-college wages. "Good" workers are assumed to invest in a college education if the ratio is sufficiently large. The assumptions lead to two types of labor market regimes, a "human capital" regime and a "quality signaling" regime.
In the human capital regime college educated workers are only employed in managerial jobs. Since a college degree is necessary for these jobs, education in this regime is socially productive. The college premium in this regime is simply the ratio of the managerial to non-managerial wages. Krugman notes that the relationship between the relative wage and the number of college graduates can be either positive or negative, but "if the effect of factor supplies on relative prices is strong and the 'screening' effect is weak" the relationship is negative, i.e. downward sloping, in the human capital regime.
The quality signaling regime takes place when some "good" workers are working in non-managerial positions. In this regime, education simply works as a signal to employers of the productivity of the non-managerial workers. Both college educated and non-college educated "good" workers are employed as non-managers. The college educated workers will receive a higher wage proportional to their higher productivity.
Note that since "good" workers are more productive in the non-managerial jobs than "bad" workers, the non-managerial wage will be higher than the marginal revenue product of the "bad" workers, as long as not all "good" workers invest in the signal. This also implies that if the number of good workers who receive a college degree, and therefore are able to separate themselves from the "bad" workers, increases, the nocollege wage will decrease. In other words, the relationship between the college premium and the number of good worker who obtain the signal is positive or upward sloping.
An obvious question is which labor market regime will prevail? The answer will depend on which regime offers the highest relative wage for a given number of "good"
workers who obtain a college degree. The relationship between the relative wage and the number of college graduates is downward sloping in the human capital regime and upward sloping in the quality signaling regime. Assuming an intercept of the two relationships exists, the regime offering the highest relative wage will take place. For example, if college graduates can receive higher wages as non-managers than managers, for a given number of college graduates, some of them will shift over to non-managerial positions. This implies that we are in a quality signaling regime. Based on the model described above, there are multiple locally stable equilibria.
One possible equilibrium is that only some "good" workers get a college education and the economy is in the human capital regime. It is also possible that all "good" workers invest in education and the quality signaling regime is observed. Krugman also shows that there are unstable equilibria as long as it is assumed that the number of college graduates increase with an increase in the relative wage. The equilibrium that the economy will be in is determined by history.
Krugman shows that it is possible for an economy to move from a relatively egalitarian human capital regime equilibrium to a quality signaling equilibrium. This may happen if there is an increase in the demand for managers, due possibly to an increase in the demand for manager intensive goods abroad or a manager biased technical change.
The important point is that it is only necessary for this exogenous shock to push the human capital regime to some critical point. After reaching this point, the economy is pushed out of the human capital regime equilibrium into a temporary unstable quality signaling equilibrium. At this point, as more "good" workers obtain a college degree, the college premium increases. This in its turn increases the incentive for other "good"
workers to invest in education. The economy will eventually reach a quality signaling regime equilibrium where all "good" workers are college graduates. Note that the exogenous shock does not need to be particularly large; it only needs to push the economy out of the egalitarian equilibrium to a critical point. From this point on, the continuous increase in educational attainment of "good" workers simply "feeds on itself".
What has been observed in the U.S. in the 1980's is consistent with the model described above. If there has been an exogenous shock, such as described by Krugman, and the new equilibrium can be portrayed in such a way that the signaling model accurately describes the schooling choice of workers, we would expect to observe both an increase in the mean educational attainment levels and an increase in the college earnings premium. The model also predicts a decline in the earnings of the least skilled. The drop in the wages of relatively low educated workers has been found to be one important factor in explaining the observed increase the educational earnings premium and consequently the increase in earnings inequality in the U. employed individuals obtain any education? In a pure screening world with perfect markets, perfect foresight and no need for customer signaling, the self-employed would not invest in schooling. However, one obvious reason we observe that the self-employed acquire schooling is that some education is required by law. It is also possible that education has consumption value. Another conceivable rationalization is that some selfemployed individuals did not anticipate becoming self-employed and made their educational choice based on the expected returns in the wage/salary sector. Assuming that one will work in the wage/salary sector when making the schooling decision seems reasonable since close to 90 percent of the labor force work in this sector. Also, some self-employed individuals who provide some professional services, for example accountants and stockbrokers, may need to obtain credentials to signal to consumers their ability to provide the service. Furthermore, for some occupations formal post-secondary education is a prerequisite. Most notable are lawyers, architects, engineers and physicians. For these reasons, the trends in educational attainment of the self-employed are predicted to somewhat resemble those of wage/salary workers, but are likely to be less pronounced.
The model utilized in this paper and the use of the self-employed as a "control" group leads to four testable predictions. The underlying assumption is that the human capital model would predict equal changes in returns to education for the two groups in response to an exogenous shock, such as described above, when relevant earnings factors are controlled for. The hypotheses are presented below.
1) The signaling model illustrated above predicts that the schooling premium for wage/salary workers will increase as a new equilibrium is reached. The selfemployed are expected to face no increase in the earnings premium, according to the signaling model. However, the earnings of some self-employed are likely to be influenced by the wage/salary sector. Earnings of groups for whom postsecondary schooling is required are likely to be at least partially determined by the larger wage/salary sector. The testable prediction is that the returns to education increased by less for the self-employed than for employees.
2) The model also predicts that the average "quality" of the lower ability, or education, group will be lower in the new equilibrium. The reason for this is that the most able ones who have not yet obtained the signal are also the ones most likely to increase their educational attainment level due to their relatively lower cost of obtaining the signal. Since the relatively more able entrepreneurs do not have the incentive to increase their educational attainment, the drop in "quality" of the relatively low-ability self-employed is predicted to be less. This implies that earnings of the least educated self-employed should have increased during the 1980's compared to the earnings of the least educated wage/salary workers. 3) The earnings of the most highly educated self-employed individuals are predicted to be most affected by the changes in earnings of wage/salary workers (this is the group for which a degree is most likely to be either required, or for which it is necessary to obtain a signal to convince clients of one's ability). Hence, the difference in the change in schooling premium between the two sectors is expected to be less for the post-graduate attainment group than for the college group.
4)
Excluding from the sample the occupations for which at least a college degree is required in order to work will increase the difference in changes in the schooling premium for the most educated individuals.
These four testable predictions of the signaling model will be tested using the data described next.
Data
The data for this study is drawn from the 1980 5% A Sample and the 1990 5% For example, the combined earnings of the self-employed include, if applicable, earnings from wage/salary work. This measure is consequently "clouded" by the changes and trends in wage/salary earnings. However, from a policy perspective, the measure for total earnings, i.e. combined earnings, is the more relevant measure since an individual's well being is determined by total income. Total income is clearly more closely related to total earnings than earnings from a particular sector. Overall, there are only a few relatively minor differences in the changes in earnings between the two measures. Since there are only small differences in the results between the two measures, and the more relevant one for testing the signaling hypothesis is separate earnings, the results discussed in the paper will focus on separate earnings. 5 The sample includes individuals who reported separate earnings of at least $100 per week in 1989 prices.
Trends and Differences in the Educational Earnings Premium
The overall trend in real weekly earnings appears to be quite similar for wage/salary employees and the self-employed in the 1980's. years of schooling while it increased by 3.1 percent for college graduates. The greatest increase for employees over the decade was for the most educated group whose earning increased by slightly more than 14 percent.
The earnings of the self-employed dropped by roughly the same percentage for the three non-college degree groups, that is, by about 10-11 percent. For self-employed college graduates earnings decreased as well, but by less, only 3.5 percent. The only group of self-employed that showed an increase in earnings was the post graduate group.
The earnings increased by 13.1, only by one percent less than the increase for this educational attainment group of wage/salary workers.
Changes in the relative earnings between schooling groups in the 1980's appear to be less dramatic for the self-employed than for wage/salary workers. The gap between the highest and lowest educated employees grew by 32.6 percent. For the self-employed this gap increased by 24.1 percent. Wage/salary college graduates increased their earnings advantage over high school dropouts by 21.6 percent while the earnings advantage for self-employed college graduates increased by only 7.5 percent over the decade. This high school diploma as 11 years; high school graduate as 12 years; some college, no degree as 13 years; associate degree as 14 years; bachelor's degree as 16 years; master's degree as 17 years and professional or doctorate degree as 20 years. It should be noted that the effect of the change in coding on comparisons of educational attainment between census years is unknown.
suggests that earnings inequality did not increase as much for the self-employed as it did for employees. The trends are quite similar using combined earnings.
It is possible that the differences in changes in real earnings between wage/salary and self-employed individuals are due to differences in the changes in the educational distribution. In order for the wage of the highly educated to grow relative to the less educated during a period in which the relative supply of highly educated workers grew, as was the case in the 1980's, the increase in relative demand of educated workers must have been dominating the supply change. If there has been a greater increase in the supply of relatively educated workers among the self-employed during the decade, this might explain the smaller differences in the changes in earnings between educational attainment groups. However, Table 2 shows that the trends in higher schooling levels during the 1980's are quite similar for the self-employed and wage/salary workers. If anything, the self-employment sector may not have displayed as great of an increase in the supply of relatively skilled individuals. The last column in Table 2 shows the difference-in-difference, (1990 self-employed-1990 wage/salary) -(1980 self-employed-1980 wage/salary), by schooling level. The differences-in-differences calculations show that relative employment in self-employed work, compared to wage/salary work, increased for the two lowest schooling groups while it decreased for the some college and above groups.
This suggests that we would expect a greater increase in the earnings of the relatively highly educated entrepreneurs than the relatively highly educated workers.
Differences in changes in the relative supply of highly educated workers do not appear to offer a good explanation of the difference in earnings trends over educational attainment groups between the self-employed and employees.
The educational earnings premium and changes in it over the decade also differ between the two groups. Table 3 shows that there has been a dramatic increase in returns to education among wage/salary workers. The observed differences in the changes of the educational earnings premium are, on the surface, consistent with the model prediction of smaller increases in the schooling premium for the self-employed. However, there are many factors that need to be controlled for to reliably test the predictions of the model.
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The greater increase in the earnings premium of wage/salary workers relative to the self-employed may be caused by changes in wage setting institutions. For example, the drop in unionization rates has been shown to cause a decrease in the economic position of the relatively less educated workers (see for example Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman, 1991 and Freeman, 1993) . Since the self-employed are clearly not unionized, any changes in earnings inequality and the educational earnings premium caused by the decline in union membership rates will only affect workers in the wage/salary sector.
Also, the increase in international trade, through an increase in imports of labor intensive manufactures from developing countries, has also been shown to have increased the earnings dispersion in the U.S. (Leamer, 1998) . This may have had a differential effect on the self-employed and wage/salary workers. In both cases, the impact is most likely to affect "between-industry" earnings differentials since unionization rates vary substantially, as does international trade, across industries.
A comparison of changes in returns to education by industry will partially control for the decline in unionization rates and globalization. It should also be noted that union density has only been found to explain a relatively small part of the earnings premium. Freeman (1993) estimates that between 15 and 40 percent of the increase in the college premium can be attributed to the downward trend in union participation rates.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the increase in international trade is not nearly sufficiently large to have caused the changes we observed in earnings inequality in the 1980's (see for example Krugman, 1995) .
Educational earnings premiums are presented by 10 broadly defined industries in Table 4 . There is considerable variation in returns to education over industries. There are also differences in these returns between the wage/salary sector and the self-employment sector in a particular industry. More importantly to this paper, the increase in the earnings premium from education in the 1980's is less for the self-employed in virtually all industries, and the earnings premium has even declined in some industries.
is not the likely source of the differences in the schooling premium between the two sectors and the findings below.
Empirical Results and Hypothesis Testing
There are numerous factors that may have affected the educational earnings premium differently for wage/salary workers and the self-employed. Potential factors include changes in, and composition of, individuals' geographic location, marital status, disability, immigrant status, returns to labor market experience and industrial composition. To account for these factors regressions of log weekly earnings functions are estimated.
The educational earnings premium will be measured in the same way as above, Based on the results of the estimated earnings function, the four testable predictions discussed above can be tested by the following hypotheses.
1) The self-employed experienced a smaller increase in the education premium,
2) The earnings of the least educated self-employed increased relative to the earnings of the least educated wage/salary workers,
The next two hypotheses follow from the idea that in some occupations a postgraduate degree is required, so that it will be more difficult to distinguish any differences between highly educated employees and self-employed individuals in these occupations.
3) The difference in the change in the schooling premium between the two sectors is expected to be less for the post-graduate attainment group than for the college group, H 0 : 4 3γ γ > .
4)
Excluding the occupations for which at least a college degree is required will increase the difference in the change over the decade in the educational earnings premium for the most educated group,
, whereγˆindicates the estimated coefficient from the restricted sample.
Although, these hypothesis tests can be performed on each model estimated, I will mostly restrict discussion of the tests to the most fully specified model. The reason for this is that the estimated coefficients will be biased in the simpler models due to omitted variables. Clearly, if the most specific model also suffers from omitted variable bias, the test results are questionable. However, the most sophisticated model is the model most likely to withstand this problem. Furthermore, this model adjusts for the factors most commonly controlled for in earnings functions estimated in the labor economics literature.
8
The results from estimating equation 1 without the vector X are shown in Table 5 as Model 1. Note that these coefficients can be used to identify the identical values shown in Table 3 . However, it is possible that some of the differences in the changes in the educational earnings premium between wage/salary employees and the self-employed can be explained by differences in changes in, and composition of, individuals geographic location, marital status, disability and immigrant status. To control for this 8 There is also a possibility that non-random self selection into self-employment or wage/salary work affects the estimated schooling premium. To control for potential endogenous sorting into the sectors, separate earnings models were estimated applying Heckman's correction method. A measure intended to reflect regional entrepreneurial conditions or opportunities, the ratio of average self-employment earnings to average wage/salary earnings ratios, by SMSA and census year, was used as an instrument to identify the inverse Mills correction terms. Models relying on non-linearity to identify the correction term were also estimated with similar results. The results, available upon request, are very similar to the ones reported in Tables 5 and 6 . The estimates suggest that conclusions drawn from Tables 5 and 6 are not sensitive to this possibility and that non-random sector selection is not driving the results presented here.
possibility, all of the above mentioned variables are added to the vector X, in addition to interactions with both self-employment and a 1990 period effect. Model 2 in Table 5 shows the results when controls for these factors are included.
The estimated changes in the education premium between 1979 and 1989 for wage/salary workers are represented by the j δˆ's from the earnings equation. The changes in the schooling premiums for the self-employed are denoted by the sum j j γ δ+ . The changes in educational earnings premium based on the estimated models in Table 5 are shown in Table 6 . The p-values from tests of no change in the schooling premiums are also presented in Table 6 . For wage/salary workers, these are calculated from the
. For the self-employed the null hypothesis is 0 = + j j γ δ .
The above mentioned controls appear to have only a small effect on the estimated 1979 schooling premium, the j τˆ's and j λˆ's, for both the self-employed and wage/salary workers. However, the change in the premium over the decade declines when the vector X is added to the model. The effect is particularly strong for the change in the difference in earnings between wage/salary high school dropouts and high school graduates. The earnings premium for high school graduates drops from 6 to 3.5 percent for wage/salary workers while it remains around 1 percent for the self-employed. In other words, almost half of the increase in the high school premium for employees can be explained by the factors included in the vector X. Furthermore, the increase in the high school and "some college" premium is insignificant for the self-employed while for employees the estimated increases were 3.5 and 9.5 percent respectively, according to model 2. The college premium increased in the 1980's for both groups but by considerably less for the self-employed, 17.3 and 6.0 percent respectively.
It is also necessary to control for labor market experience in the earnings model. It is particularly important for the model to allow for possible differences in changes in returns to experience since it has been found that returns to experience also changed in the 1980's (see for example Katz and Murphy, 1992) . Model 3 in Table 5 adds a quartic in labor market experience, where experience is measured as age -years of schooling -6.
These variables are also interacted with self-employment and a 1990 period effect.
Adding the experience controls to the earnings function alters the estimated changes in the schooling premiums substantially. The change in the high school premium for wage/salary workers drop from 3.5 to 0.9 percent. The estimated change in the earnings premiums for some college and college graduates decline from 9.4 to 5.4 percent and from 17.3 to 14.7 percent respectively for employees. The results in Model 3 indicate a decrease, although not significant, in the change in the high school premium for the self-employed. The model also implies a decrease of 2.7 percent, which is statistically significant, in the premium for some college. The increase in the college premium for the self-employed was substantially lower than for wage/salary workers.
Model 3 indicates an increase by 14.7 percent for employees while the self-employed experienced an increase by only 2.8 percent. The difference in the increase in the schooling premium for individuals with postgraduate training is substantially smaller.
Wage/salary workers and entrepreneurs in this schooling group increased their earnings advantage over high school dropouts by 21.2 percent and 17.9 percent respectively. The second prediction of the signaling model to be tested is whether the least educated entrepreneurs increased their earnings relative to the least educated employees.
The null hypothesis can be tested based on the estimated coefficient on the interaction between self-employment and the 1990 period effects,υ . The null hypothesis of equal change is rejected. The earnings of the self-employed in this schooling group grew by 10.2 percent more than it did for wage/salary high school dropouts.
The third hypothesis tests whether the difference in the change of the educational earnings premium between the two sectors is less for the post-graduate group than for the college group. It is expected that the earnings of the most educated self-employed individuals will be influenced more by the changes in the earnings of wage/salary workers than the earnings of the relatively less educated entrepreneurs. The reason for this prediction is that a greater proportion of the self-employed in this education group either has to have a higher degree to practice their profession or have to obtain a credential to signal their ability to potential customers. Hence, the earnings trend of the highly skilled in the two sectors are expected to be more similar than the changes in earnings of the relatively less skilled. The null hypothesis of equal change in the schooling premium for the college and post-graduate group is rejected at the 1 percent level.
The fourth hypothesis tests if omitting the sub-sample of the occupations for which at least a college degree is required in order to work increases the difference in the change in the schooling premium of the most educated. To test this hypothesis Model 4 was re-estimated without individuals in occupations that are likely to require at least a college degree 9 . The results are presented as Model 5 in Tables 5 and 6 . Excluding these occupations changes the estimated increase in the schooling premium very little for wage/salary workers. The greatest impact is, expectedly, on the change in the earnings advantage of the most educated workers, which decreases from 19.2 percent to 15.6 percent. Excluding these occupations decreases the estimated coefficients for the difference between the two sectors in the change over the decade. There is however one exception. The absolute value of 4 γ , the estimated coefficient on the variable interacting the dummy variables for more than 16 years of education, self-employment and the 1990 period effect, is slightly higher when the restricted sample is used. 4 γ is the only estimated i γˆ that increases in an absolute sense when Model 4 is re-estimated using the restricted sample. This indicates that excluding the occupations for which at least a college degree is required increases somewhat the difference in the change over the decade in the educational earnings premium for the most educated group. There appears to be some support, although somewhat weak, for acceptance of the fourth hypothesis.
The real value of the federal minimum wage fell from $4. 95 in 1979 to $3.35 in 1989, in 1989 prices. It is quite possible that the decline in the minimum wage has exerted a downward pressure on the wages of the least educated wage/salary workers, the group most likely to receive the minimum wage, while it has had no effect on the least educated self-employed. If so, this would lead to higher returns to education among employees than among entrepreneurs. To address this possibility, the models presented in Table 5 were estimated with a sample excluding individuals whom reported earning the minimum wage, or less, in 1989 dollars. The results change very little with the expected exception that the schooling premium dropped slightly.
Overall, I find evidence of support for the four testable predictions of the model presented. The changes observed in the U.S. in the 1980's is consistent with what a signaling model predicts from a change from a human capital regime to a quality signaling regime in response to an exogenous shock. That is, if we move from an equilibrium with relatively low schooling levels to one with higher average attainment levels, we would observe both an increase in educational attainment and in the educational earnings premium.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper I pose the question whether a signaling model can explain the observed increase in the educational earnings premium in the 1980's, as was suggested by Krugman (2000) , and consequently the increase in earnings inequality over this period. 
